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Abstract. This paper attempts to integrate discourse theories, mainly the theory 
of hegemony by Essex School, and Tartu–Moscow School’s cultural semiotics, and 
sets for itself the modest task to point to the applicability of semiotic approach in 
political analysis. The so-called post-foundationalist view, that is common for dis-
course theories, is primarily characterized by the rejection of essentialist notions 
of ground for the social, and the inauguration of cultural and discursive charac-
teristics (such as asymmetry and entropy; explosion; antagonism; insurmountable 
tension between organization and disorganization, regularity and irregularity, 
etc.) into the wider social scientific paradigm. Customarily, those characteristics 
have been attributed to contingent or peripheral events and phenomena that by 
nature do not belong to the social structure proper. Grounds for such ‘groundless’ 
contingencies are found in philosophy (Marchart), or for instance from the psy-
choanalytic notion of affect (Laclau). Many discourse theorists proceed here from 
Derrida’s position that in the process of signification there is an overabundance 
of meaning which renders final closure impossible (Howarth; Glynos). However, 
it seems that despite placing communication at the heart of their conceptions of 
discourse, the communicative character of constructing power relations remains 
undertheorized in those conceptions. This article attempts to approach the above 
mentioned problem by way of the concepts of communication and autocom-
munication (Lotman). The outcomes stemming from the latter are unavoidable, 
since the result of any possible research (text) itself belongs to culture or a larger 
discourse and opera tes as the organizing function of the latter. Hence, research 
practice and its results always need to be looked at as mutually affecting each other. 
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Up until the 1990s one could observe the expansion of semiotics into 
different disciplines of the humanities and social sciences. This was 
characterized by all sorts of pursuits in which semiotics was almost a 
suffix: for example, legal semiotics, theatre semiotics, cinema semiot-
ics and so forth. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, Pertti Ahonen (1987; 
1993) wrote about a Copernican revolution in political science, above 
all impelled by adding the semiotic perspective into political science, 
which should eventually enrich the methodological underpinnings of 
the latter. If we take a look at the current situation, the perspective is 
very different: political semiotics, as a field and despite a small number 
of publications in this realm, some very good, has regressed more than 
progressed (Drechsler 2009: 74). A series of concrete analyses have been 
published that use semiotics as a supplementary methodology (Xing-
Hua 2005; Zichermann 2006; Clark, Jacobs 2002), but less development, 
with some exceptions (Petrilli 2006; Ponzio 2006), towards a more gene-
ral methodological break has come to pass.1 One of the consequences of 
that may be “straw man” view of semiotics from other disciplines as a 
strictly structuralist endeavour, a science that attempts to reduce every-
thing to static structures, neglecting the communicative and contextual 
character of the generation of meaning. The basis for this criticism was 
a one-sided reduction of semiotics to the structural linguistics of de 
Saussure and from there to the early works of Barthes (Chandler 2002; 
Culler 1975; Burgin 1986; Laclau 2004: 301–302; 2005: 110)2. As a result, 
further developments in semiotics were left largely unnoticed by critics.
One of the modest purposes of the present paper is to sketch one 
possible approach to political analysis in which semiotics is able to, at 
least in the present author’s opinion, have an equal, effective and mutu-
ally complementary say in matters of discourse analysis, especially in 
the theory of hegemony. First I will try to explicate post-foundational 
approach. Describing major problems of political analyses — politics/
1 The situation is better for advancing the interdisciplinary fusion of sociology and 
semiotics (Heiskala 2003).
2 For the spread of Lotman’s ideas, and especially the problems accompanying this 
spread in the Soviet Union and outside, see Kull, Lotman 1995; Waldstein 2008.
60 Andreas Ventsel
political, power, I will simultaneously describe the main presumptions 
of post-foundational approach.
In the second part of the paper I will try to draw attention to the 
congenialities that unite the Tartu–Moscow semiotics of culture and 
the Essex theories of hegemony on both the ontological and the episte-
mological level. In my opinion these may turn out to be fruitful points 
of contact that would aid in expanding the toolkit used in political 
analyses. 
And finally I will draw attention to some implications that arise 
for delineating the objects of political analyses and practical scientific 
activities once we place the concept of communication into the theo-
retical core of these analyses. Lotman’s communication model, which 
includes also auto-communication model in communication process, 
affords, in author’s opinion, to elaborate one theoretical presumption 
for post-foundational problem of so-called “ground for groundless”. 
This is because the result of any possible research (text) itself belongs 
to culture or a larger discourse and operates as the organizing function 
of the latter.
Since there have been extensive papers published on concrete analy-
ses based on cultural semiotics and the theory of hegemony (Selg, 
Ventsel 2008, 2010; Ventsel 2009), this paper will mostly focus on expli-
cating methodological issues. 
1. Post-foundational approach in political science
The term ‘post-foundational approach’ includes different kinds of 
academic research programs. But they all share some fundamental 
principles — post-foundational approaches do not perceive objects as 
given, or as epiphenomena of some basic metaphysical principle, but as 
constructions; this also leads to giving up the presumption of a “natural 
order” of things, and the actualisation of the question of the contingent 
nature of every “order” (Marchart 2007). And this significant reality or 
so-called “order” is constituted through communication. It is for these 
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reasons that questions such as: What is meaning? How does it arise in 
communication? What are its consequences for the general constitution 
of society? etc are the focus of post-foundational approaches. This is 
why cultural factors like the influence of language, values, memory etc 
become relevant for studying these processes.
 Post-foundationalism must not be confused with anti-founda-
tionalism or a vulgar and today somewhat out-dated “anything goes” 
postmodernism, since a post-foundational approach does not to attempt 
to erase completely such figures of ground, but to weaken their onto-
logical status. 
The ontological weakening of ground does not lead to the assumption of total 
absence of all grounds, but rather to the assumption of the impossibility of 
final ground, which is something entirely different as it implies an increased 
awareness of, on the one hand, contingency and, on the other, the political as 
the moment of partial and always, in the last instance, unsuccessful grounding. 
(Marchart 2007: 2) 
Such endless play between ground and groundless also suggests 
accep ting the necessity of decision (premised upon ontological undecid-
ability) and being aware of division, discord, and antagonism, as every 
decision — since it cannot be based on a stable ground, nor will it be 
taken in the solitary vacuum of complete groundlessness — will always 
be confronted with competing claims and forces (Marchart 2007: 3).
Concerning the main topic of the present paper — politics — the 
post-foundationalist approach is predicated on political activity always 
taking place in sedimented layers of traditions that are ungrounded, 
flexible and changeable. It means that the narrow definition of politics 
(the practice of government) has been abandoned and we have to dif-
ferentiate between the concept of politics and a concept of the political.3
‘Politics’ refers primarily to politics as a specific field, as particu-
lar institutions and institutionalized activities that are usually thought 
of as being part of politics — for example, what politicians do in the 
3 The roots of this distinction in contemporary political thought can be retraced 
to Paul Ricoeur’s (1965[1956]) distinction between politics and the political, and to 
Carl Schmitt’s conception of the political (Schmitt 1996[1936]).
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parliaments, or in the rhetoric of pre-election debates and so on. In 
other words, the things about which we read in the political supple-
ments of daily newspapers. ‘Political’, on the other hand, refers mainly 
to the existence of permanent antagonisms or conflicts in society that 
can never be completely resolved and which are thus present in any act 
of signification. 
By ‘the political’ I mean the dimension of antagonism which I take to be cons-
titutive of human societies, while by ‘politics’ I mean the set of practices and 
institutions through which an order is created, organizing human coexistence 
in the context of conflictuality provided by the political. (Mouffe 2005: 9)
If discovering the ultimate principle of the constitution of a society was 
possible, politics would disappear. Why? Because then there would be 
nothing left besides administrative management and the fulfilment of 
some ultimate plan, which is something experienced during the Soviet 
period at least on the rhetorical level. This would mean that politics as a 
practice of trying to find a balance between different social forces would 
become meaningless. 
As Laclau has said, “the problem of the political is the problem of 
the institution of the social, that is, of the definition and articulation 
of social relations in a field criss-crossed with antagonism” (Laclau, 
Mouffe 1985: 153). This is because, as Oliver Marchart (2007: 5–6) 
writes, the political is included potentially in every social practice of 
signification. This is due to the logic of certain signification processes, 
which do not only appear in political discourse, but also in other fields 
that constitute social life. Thus politics can always be understood as an 
expression of the power of discourses. In the following I try to clarify 
the post-foundationalist approach in political science in the context of 
the concept of power. 
1.1. Post-foundational point of view of power
This brings us directly to the need to conceptualise the relations between 
power and politics. In searching for an answer, post-foundational 
63Hegemonic signifi cation from cultural semiotics point of view
approach consciously moves away from the essentialist or positivist 
approaches to power (the best-known of which would be liberalism and 
Marxism) that define power as a certain “thing”. Such “things” have the 
peculiarity that they can, at least in principle, be divided in one way or 
the other; they are characterised by their distributive nature, or in other 
words: one can discuss the possession or non-possession of things — 
and one can draw a clear boundary between those units that/who have 
particular things and those that/who do not. In principle, here we see an 
approach that was described above as characteristic of positivist social 
science: power is conceptualised as a given (positive) and defined fact. 
Thus these approaches see as their biggest problem the normative “jus-
tification” (liberalism) or “critique” (Marxism) of this “reification of 
power”. Plainly, such operations would probably not be possible with 
relations and processes. 
The basis for the semiotic view of the theory of hegemony is, instead, 
the tradition that has developed through Antonio Gramsci’s theory of 
hegemony (Gramsci 1971) and Michel Foucault’s approach to “dis-
course” and “power” (Foucault 1980, 1990). For Gramsci, hegemony is 
not something that could be described by the characteristics of power, 
coercion or domination (dominio). It is dependent, instead, on the 
spontaneous willingness of subjected subjects to agree with the ideas 
produced by intellectuals. It should be emphasized that Gramsci does 
not think of the legitimisation of hegemonic formations as a conse-
quence of propaganda or brainwashing, nor is it explainable merely as a 
calculation of rational interests. Rather all these factors are seen to have 
a part in forming that unity. 
As is well known, Foucault does not consider power to be only 
an instrument of repression — rather, power is what makes things 
and talking about things possible. Power does not only say “no” but 
it produces things, induces pleasure, forms knowledge, and produces 
discourses (Foucault 1980: 37). For the most part, the mechanisms of 
the functioning of power are not based on justice, law and the threat of 
punishment, but rather on techniques, ideals that express normality and 
various mechanisms of control (Foucault 1990: 89–90). Thus
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Power must be understood in the first instance as the multiplicity of force 
relations immanent in the sphere in which they operate and which constitute 
their own organization; as the process, trough ceaseless struggles and confron-
tations, transforms, strengthens, or reverses them; as the support which these 
force relations find in one another, thus forming a chain or a system, or on the 
contrary, the disjunctions and contradictions which isolate them from one 
another; and lastly, as the strategies in which they take effect, whose general 
design or institutional crystallization is embodied in the state apparatus, in 
the formulation of the law, in the various social hegemonies. (Foucault 1990: 
92–93)
In the light of the above, the old questions, such as “Who has power?” or 
“Who are repressed by power?” lose their former acuity. The described 
approach draws attention to analysing hidden power relations, espe-
cially the power of discourse, as opposed to the previous object of 
analysis of the social scientists — the relations between the state and 
its administrative apparatus, and the people. Hegemony becomes the 
central concept for defining political discourse. This means that any 
hegemony or relationship of power is understood here not as direct 
influence — the best example of which would be pure physical vio-
lence — but as always mediated by signs; that is, semiotic mediation. 
And since imposing a hegemonic relationship is in no way reducible to 
a single ground, such as for example in Marxism’s resort to the nature 
of economic relationships, but instead, showing that all the factors that 
shape human existence have their role to play, it follows that the ‘semio-
tics of culture’ approach is in a good position to explain hegemonic 
processes.
From a post-foundationalist or anti-essentialist perspective, power 
relations are not something pre-given; instead, they are constructed 
through social and cultural meanings. This means that all power rela-
tions are discursive relations and “objectivity” as such is constructed 
specifically in discourse (Laclau 2005: 68). It is important that the field 
of application of the concept of discourse is not only limited to writing 
or speech, but that it refers to any complex of elements where relations 
play a constitutive role (ibid.). For Laclau, the question of social and 
political reality thus boils down to the question of the constitution of 
discourse. According to Laclau, hegemony should be interpreted only 
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on the basis of discourse: a hegemonic relationship is nothing other 
than an articulation of meanings, a particular logic of the significa-
tion process. However, some additional general remarks on the relations 
between discourse and power are in order. 
For the purposes of this paper, it is important to clarify that hegemo-
nic discourse does not only consider the discourses of those in power. 
The well-known discourse theoretician Norman Fairclough (1992: 
64) distinguishes analytically the following relation complexes for 
discursive power: Power of discourse; Power in discourse; Power over 
discourse. In the present context, only the latter distinction is relevant: 
power over discourse. Both power of discourse and power in discourse 
primarily deal with reproduction and the way different signification 
systems manipulate with people. The problem is that the subject has 
been left with no freedom whatsoever — the reproduction of discourse 
dominates over change, contest, and subjectivity. This problem — the 
disappearance of the so-called subject as an agent — has haunted both 
early Foucault and the structuralists (Althusser) (Fairclough 1992: 64). 
In On Populist Reason Laclau describes the construction of ‘the 
people’ and its populist origin. According to him, populism is one of the 
ways that the hegemonic logic of signification may occur and is not at 
all a stranger to democratic social organization and free media (Laclau 
2005). This means that opposing discourses that are alternative to the 
dominant discourse could have the same logic of signification. Instead 
of viewing reality as something determined by discourse, the notion 
of “power over discourse” leads us to ask who produces dominant dis-
courses, and who tries to challenge and transform them: 
As meanings are not fixed, the process of constructing and reproducing dis-
courses is not automatic or inevitable, but involves choice. On the other hand, 
those placed in a subordinated position often develop counter discourses as 
forms of resistance in order to bring the dominant system of meaning into 
question and change it. (Raik 2003: 26) 
(Re)production of dominant meanings can take the form of the exercise 
of, or struggle for, power; “discourse is the power which is to be seized” 
(Foucault 1980: 52–53). 
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Above I provided a general sketch of the ways in which the primary 
topic of political analyses — the problem of power — is interpreted 
within the post-foundationalist tradition. The semiotic approach to 
power developed below is closely related to the post-foundationalist 
view. In what follows, I will briefly describe the ways in which semi-
otics could play a role in political analyses, and the ontological and 
epistemological levels of such an approach.
2. Toward a semiotic theory of hegemony 
An interdisciplinary connection between discourse theory and semio-
tics of culture is raised in some general issues, primarily associated with 
the mutual relations between different disciplines, their hierarchy, and 
the identity of the object of research. Here I would like to highlight two 
primary questions. 
First, in what way does the object of research correlate with the 
method of research, that is, to what extent do research methods not only 
explain, but also constitute and construct the object being studied? The 
present approach is well aware of these difficulties and acknowledges 
that in essence this is an ad hoc approach, a creation of a synthesized 
research language. Discourse theory and semiotics of culture have 
acknowledged programmatically that both are involved in creating an 
ad hoc research method (Wodak, Meyer 2001; Ivanov et al. 1998). This 
means that the researcher is aware of the correlation between cultural 
diversity and the diversity of the disciplinary and hybrid meta-lan-
guages that attempt to describe it. 
Second, to what degree does the identity of the disciplines them-
selves persist in the situation where the boundaries between different 
disciplines have become diffuse? This is especially a problem when we 
consider the fact that the primary source of interdisciplinary approaches 
is the powerlessness of older scientific languages in coming to grips with 
explaining the diversity of the world, rather than a mere unification of 
different disciplines (Barthes 1980). As Peeter Torop (2009: 26) writes, 
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the necessity of dealing with problems of ontology and epistemology is 
above all generated by a dialogue on a sub-disciplinary level, since the 
intermingling of theories and meta-languages may not develop into a 
new synthesis or identity. 
The next section sets as its goal the avoidance of this possible con-
fusion and attempts to distinguish between the ontological and the 
epistemological level in the semiotic theory of hegemony.
2.1. Ontological premises
The impossibility/ untranslatability of the closure
Poststructuralist or post-foundationalist ontology is not reducible to 
an inventory of the kinds of things in the world. One of its concerns 
is the different kinds of things in the world, but more importantly it 
is concerned with the being of these things (Glynos, Howarth 2007). 
These versions of ontology have at the very roots of their approach the 
so-called transcendental turn of modern philosophy (usually associa-
ted with the works of Immanuel Kant). The transcendental turn’s 
breakthrough is generally considered to consist in redirecting the cent-
ral attention of analysis from facts to their conditions of possibility. 
The general thesis of this approach is that any perception, thinking or 
acting, presupposes some structuration of the field of meanings that 
precedes any factual immediacy (Laclau 1993). 
For the interdisciplinary approach that has been developed else-
where (Selg, Ventsel 2008, 2010; Ventsel 2009), it is relevant that both 
semiotics of culture and the theory of hegemony of the Essex school 
are derived, to a certain extent, from the linguistic tradition of Saus-
sure, and thus view signification as a system of differences. Semiotics 
of culture has developed from the semiotics of language by way of the 
semiotics of text, culminating in today’s semiotics of the semiosphere 
(Portis-Winner 1999; Torop 2003, 2009). Similarly, many discourse 
theorists have acknowledged the linguistic origin of their theoretical 
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conceptions, primarily by way of the tradition stemming from the lin-
guistic theories of Benveniste and Saussure that have later developed 
into different approaches in discourse analysis (Wodak, Meyer 2001; 
Seriot 1999; Laclau 1993).
Both approaches view signification on the basis of a total sys-
tem. Nevertheless, while being aware of the inevitable closure of this 
imaginary totality, both Tartu–Moscow semiotics of culture and Essex 
discourse theory are simultaneously aware that this significant totality 
is never closed off entirely, but only represents the researcher’s tem-
porary operational construction in an endless semiosis. This means 
that any field of discursive social relations (Laclau’s terminology) or 
text (Lotman’s terminology) is marked by radical contingency, where 
radical contingency refers to the inherent (as opposed to accidental) 
instability of an object’s identity. The significance of radical or onto-
logical contingency is highlighted when contrasted with empirical or 
ontic contingency, as evident in Bhaskar’s critical realism. By empiri-
cal contingency we aim to capture a sense of possibility: the possibility 
that contingency may be absorbed by a higher order process (Glynos, 
Howarth 2007). According to this position, the relativist nature of our 
conception of objects does not lead to the relativization of objective 
knowledge. Radical contingency opposes empirical contingency’s sense 
of possibility with a sense of impossibility: the constitutive failure of any 
objectivity to attain a full identity4. Other formulations of radical con-
tingency as an ontological premise include ‘lack in the Other’ (Lacan), 
‘structural undecidability’ (Derrida), and so on, all of which question 
the idea of a fully constituted essence of a practice, regime or object, in 
the name of an irreducible negativity that cannot be reabsorbed (Coole 
2000). 
For the semiotics of culture as well as for the theory of hegemony of 
the Essex School, untranslatability is a constitutive condition of mea-
ning and thus of social communication. Laclau approaches this point 
4 Glynos, Jason; Howarth, David. Intepretations, mechanisms and logics. Presen-
tation at 1st IDA World Conference, September 8–10, 2008, Roskilde University, 
Denmark; p.15.
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with the concepts of antagonism and the logic of difference/ equiva-
lence. In an actual process of signification, these two logics are always 
simultaneously present, and are not completely reducible to one another 
due to their antagonistic nature. One of the logics may simply be more 
prevalent than the other.
For Lotman it is the result of the inevitable dichotomy between con-
tinuous and discrete coding systems.5 According to Lotman, a basic 
precondition for any generation of meaning is (at least) this dual coding 
(Lotman 2004b). By language, Lotman understands “every system that 
serves the purpose of facilitating communication between two or seve-
ral individuals” (Lotman 1977: 14). On the most fundamental level, 
there is coding between discrete and continuous systems of coding. 
First is the formation of text; this comes together like linear chains of 
linked segments (Lotman 2001[1978]: 36). In Laclau’s vocabulary this 
is a case of the logic of difference. In a continuous coding system the 
meaning is organized neither in a linear nor in a temporal sequence, 
but is “washed over” the n-dimension semantic space of a given text. 
We may have difficulty in isolating its component signs, and this task 
smacks of artificiality (Lotman 2001[1978]: 36). In Laclau’s vocabulary 
this is a case of logic of equivalence. 
These languages are, moreover, mutually completely untranslatable 
into one another. This means that, similarly to Laclau, Lotman also 
perceives the impossibility of a final closure of a meaningful struc -
ture — that is, radical contingency — as a primary ontological property. 
This structural openness immediately raises the problem of the status of 
the object under study, and leads us to epistemological questions — how 
5 For this reason, for the purposes of the approach developed in this work, politi-
cal is not some regional category in cultural processes, but is in some sense present 
(even if only latently), in every structure of signification, in the form of an antago-
nism. In the same manner, “culture” does not refer only to forms of art — to so-
called ‘high culture’. From the perspective of the semiotics of culture, restricting 
culture in such a manner would be meaningless, since (minimally) two semiotic 
mecha nisms (languages) constitute the principle of construction for any semiotic 
phenomenon; similarly, for a non-administrative model of politics, reducing politi-
cal to that region of society that consists of governmental activities would be limi-
ting in the extreme. 
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and with what means of analysis can we study social phenomena in a 
condition of radical contingency?
2.2. Epistemological premises
Text/discourse
It may be argued that in earlier linguistics of text, discourse indicated 
a concrete, socially presented text or speech and “text” referred to the 
abstract structures of discourse. Simplifying somewhat, we can say that 
in this case discourse corresponds to parole and text corresponds to 
langue (see Dijk 1998: 194–195). The present approach has abandoned 
this distinction. Text and discourse are here approached by way of their 
similar functional properties that supplement these conceptions in 
semiotics of culture and in the Essex theory of hegemony.
In order to rectify this situation, one needs to approach text/ dis-
course as a paradoxical phenomenon. It is, on the one hand, a unity, 
a closed totality with a clear outline — otherwise it would not even be 
perceptible as a text/ discourse — but it is also a totality that is born out 
of an open, uncountable multitude of heterogeneous and multi-face-
ted components. Possibilities for its interpretation cannot be forced 
into pre-given structures because of the inexhaustible potentialities of 
the interactions between the components and sources that comprise 
it. According to semiotics of culture, “text is a carrier of total mea-
ning and total function (if we distinguish between the viewpoints of 
the researcher and the bearer of culture, the text is the bearer of total 
function for the former and the bearer of total meaning for the latter). 
Regarded in this manner, it can be treated as the basic element (unit) of 
culture” (Ivanov et al. 1998: 3.0.0). The essence of culture is semiotic, as 
it is based on information and communication. The concept of text func-
tions on two methodological levels: it signifies 1) natural textual objects 
(for example, books) and 2) textualizable objects (culture) (Ivanov et al. 
1998: 3.1.0). The textual aspect of textual analysis means working with 
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clearly delineated sign systems, texts or collections of texts, whereas the 
processual aspect of textual analysis presumes delineation, the creation 
or reconstruction of totalities (Torop 2009: 35). Text and textualization 
signify that the object of analysis has been delineated, and the latter 
(the frame) in its own turn enables one to (operationally) structure the 
object (ibid.). This makes it possible to distinguish between the different 
structural levels of the object and to study the mechanisms of transla-
tion between them. In this way the concrete and the abstract, the static 
and the dynamic aspect are all assembled into the concept of text. In 
his later works, Lotman replaces the concept of text with that of the 
semiosphere, which better highlights the dynamic aspects of culture — 
every semiosphere can be studied as a separate totality, but now there 
is an explicit methodological principle that every totality in culture 
that can be analysed is simultaneously part of a larger totality (Torop 
2003: 335–336). This results in a seamless dialogue between parts and 
wholes, and in the dynamics of the total dimension. Nevertheless, for 
the semiotics of culture, text has remained the central concept, since as 
a concept it can refer to both a concrete artefact and an invisible abstract 
totality (as a mental text in the consciousness or sub-consciousness) 
(Torop 2009: 35).
Functionally similar to the treatment of text/ semiosphere in the 
semiotics of culture, Laclau and the Essex school approach discourse 
as a delineated, significant totality. Here Laclau’s position is opposed 
to Foucault’s treatment of discourse. The first criticism is about the 
distinction between discourse and what is left outside discourse. In his 
so-called archaeological period, Foucault still distinguishes between 
1) the rules of formation of discourse, the conditions that the distribu-
tion of the elements of the formation of discourse are subject to (objects, 
statements, topics) and 2) external conditions of discursive forma-
tions, which Foucault calls “primary” relationships. The latter can be 
described as residing between institutions, techniques, social forms etc., 
independently of discourse or objects of discourse (Foucault 2002). For 
Laclau discourse is not an object among many, as it is for instance for 
the earlier Foucault, but rather the primary terrain of objectivity as such 
72 Andreas Ventsel
(Laclau 2005a: 68). Discourse as the totality of meanings overcomes the 
distinction between the linguistic and the extra-linguistic. For Laclau, 
nothing is constituted outside discourse. If discourse is to be understood 
as a historically specific system of meanings that is embedded in a set of 
social practices, institutions and organisations (Howarth, Stavrakakis 
2000), it follows that the entirety of human reality is meaningful and 
constituted by norms, systems, rules and shared truths, reproduced and 
transformed through social activity.
The second criticism pertains to the problem of the unity of dis-
course. In his later, so-called genealogical period, Foucault’s position 
was that the principle for the unity of a discursive formation cannot be 
discovered from referring to the same object, from the unitary style in 
producing utterances, from the stability of concepts nor from referring 
to a unitary topic, but only from what he called “regularity in disper-
sion” — that is, a stability in external relations between elements that are 
not subordinate to any basic or essential principle of structuration (Fou-
cault 1990). But if the regularity of the dispersion is the only principle 
for the unity of a discursive formation, the question remains about the 
boundaries between discursive formations, a question for which Fou-
cault could at that phase provide no precise answer (Laclau 1993: 434). 
So the problem of the constitution of social and political reality becomes 
for Laclau the problem of the constitution of discourse.6 This closing up 
into a significant totality should be understood as a temporary equi-
librium between the logic of difference and the logic of equivalence in 
the process of signification (Laclau, Mouffe 1985: 112). This closing off, 
albeit temporary, is nevertheless inevitable, since otherwise there would 
be no process of signification and thus no meaning (Laclau 1996). It 
is this partial fastening of the relations between the ‘signifier’ and the 
6 On the other hand, Stuart Hall and the Birmingham School retain “the onto-
logical separation between different types of social practice, whether understood 
as ideological, sociological, economic or political. Discourse theorists, by contrast, 
affirm the discursive character of all social practices and objects, and reject the idea 
that ideological practices simply constitute one area or ‘region’ of social relations” 
(Howarth, Stavrakakis 2000: 4).
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‘signified’ (according to one English translation of Saussure — A.V.) that 
is called “hegemony” (Laclau 1993: 436). 
2.3. Translation as a means of analysis
In addition to several functional similarities between Lotman’s and 
Laclau’s theoretical positions — between the equivalent logic of sig-
nification and continuous coding, text and discourse, asymmetry and 
heterogeneity, but also the treatment of the concept of boundary — 
Laclau’s theory of hegemony is indebted to the psychoanalytic tradition, 
especially to its Lacanian version. Proceeding from Derrida’s basic idea 
of deconstruction that different possible relations between structural 
elements cannot be decided about by proceeding only from themselves, 
it follows that (1) the actually existing configuration is essentially con-
tingent; (2) that it cannot be explained by the structure itself, but only 
by way of a force that necessarily has to be partially external to the 
structure. It is the role of hegemonic power that Laclau associates with 
Lacan’s concept of affect. Falling into the convolutions of psychoanalysis 
may be considered as the primary weakness of Laclau’s theory of hege-
mony, as it bars off concrete empirical analyses of political discourse. 
This leads us to another problem with respect to analyzability. 
According to Laclau, any movement from one hegemonic formation to 
another is always through a radical break, as a creation ex nihilo. This 
does not entail that all the elements of the discourse will be entirely new, 
but that the name of the discourse, the “empty signifier” around which 
the new formation is reconstructed, does not derive its central role 
from any logic that was already in operation in the previous situa tion 
(Laclau 2005: 228). It seems to me that Laclau rather stays at the level 
of anti-foundationalism. I do not mean to claim that translation from 
one formation to another is determined by some pre-given structural 
transformation, but if we proceed from the premise that communica-
tion is possible, it appears that some historico-culturally contingent 
codes and mechanisms of translation occur with higher probability 
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than others. By translating this problem into the theoretical framework 
and vocabulary of semiotics of culture we may say that all meanings 
in culture are gene rated by the combined effect of different languages 
and levels of texts, and in reality they do not exist as isolable entities, 
but enter into complex mutual relations by communicating (Ivanov 
et al. 1998: 1.0.0). This means that while absolutely identical transla-
tion between these different cultural languages (logics of signification) 
into one another is impossible in principle, an approximate translation 
is possible and operates as a generator of new information (Lotman 
2004a). The invariant translation/ filtering function of the boundary 
is materialized in different ways on different levels. At the level of the 
semiosphere it represents the division of self from other, the filtra-
tion of external communications and the translation thereof into its 
own language, as well as the transformation of external non-commu-
nication into communications, that is, the semiotization of incoming 
materials and the transformation of the latter into information (Lot-
man 2005a: 210). An appreciation of internal and external space is not 
fixed. The very fact of the presence of a boundary is significant (Lotman 
2005a: 213). A pair of mutually non-juxtaposable signifying elements, 
between which, thanks to the context they share, a relationship of ade-
quacy is established, form a semantic trope (Lotman 2001: 37). This 
means that tropes are not external ornaments, something applied to 
a thought from the outside — they constitute the essence of creative 
thinking, and their functions extend beyond art (Lotman 2001: 37). 
These tropes and strategies of translation do not appear completely ex 
nihilo but are in some particular relationship with cultural languages 
prevalent in the culture, and with the hierarchy of cultural texts. This 
is revealed especially in the fact that certain ideological systems can 
connect the germ that generates culture precisely to something external, 
the non-organized sphere, opposing to it the internal, ordered field as a 
culturally lifeless one (Ivanov et al. 1998: 1.3.0)7. Let’s give a few examp-
les from the arsenal of cultural semiotics. 
7 This is an objection against Laclau’s claim that any meaningful signification 
needs an affect as an anchor point which stops the play between syntagmatic and 
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Dominant text
One of the direct consequences of the intersection of different texts 
are the cases where the invading text subordinates the prospects of the 
earlier text to generate new meanings. The typical consequence of an 
invasion of an alien text is “text-in-text”, in which case the alien text 
takes on a series of functions: to be a catalyst for meaning, to change the 
character of primary signification, to remain unnoticed (Lotman 2004c: 
66). In the present context, we will focus on the first two functions. 
In such a case, the basis for the generation of meaning is the switch, 
on the basis of some internal structural principle, from one system of 
semiotic understanding of text to another (Lotman 2004c: 66). There is 
an exchange of the encoding language required for translation, which 
in its turn brings about a rearrangement of prior textual structures. It is 
easy to notice here the appearance of hegemonic relations in the process 
of signification — the intruding text may acquire a dominant position 
in discourse and start determining the ways other texts can be inter-
preted. The meaningful totality is built up through translating several 
independent structures into a mutual relation of equivalence trough the 
dominant text. Thus during the 1940s the classic works of Marxism-
Leninism became dominant, and the appearance of and possibilities 
for interpreting other texts in the public circulation of texts became 
subordinated. During the Soviet period, there was a widespread prac-
tice of adding editorial instructions for the reader for interpreting the 
book, interspersed with quotes from the classics of communism, that 
were supposed to “help” the reader to the “right” track. This is a good 
example of the appearance of a dominant text in the situation of a “text 
within text”. In the end, these formed a sort of language that became 
the basis for new codings. A text (in this instance, a particular piece of 
Marxism-Leninism) can, during further communication, become part 
associative poles of language. Otherwise there is no signification at all (Laclau 2004: 
302–303). As a result, Laclau does not pay any theoretical attention to the fact that 
the space outside of the text is itself hierarchical and participates actively in the 
process of textual generation. 
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of the domain of the encoding language, that is, it itself becomes an 
element in the encoding language from which new texts are formed 
(Lotman 1977: 51–53).
Dominant language
One of the grounding principles in the semiotics of culture is that a text 
is never encoded in a single language, and different kinds of organiza-
tion can be perceived behind the text. In the present context, however, 
we are interested in cases where “in general the text has been encoded 
with some dominant code, besides which we can find local (second, 
third level) encodings” (Lotman 2005b: 427). From the perspective of 
the self-reflection of the ideologies of political regimes (especially in 
totalitarian societies), politics performed the subordinating function 
par excellence, which is expressed in the dominant role of the political 
dimension with respect to other fields that constitute the society (such 
as philosophy, religion, aesthetics, ethics, justice, etc.) (Kupina 1995: 
13–15; Ventsel 2009). In a situation of signification, one dominant lan-
guage — code — subordinates other means of coding, thereby uniting 
different signifiers into a chain of equivalence. Hegemony is imposed by 
cutting off other codes and by the expansion of the chain of equivalence 
of the signifiers.
Code-Text
We can also distinguish principles of organization in the process of sig-
nification that operate in a more concealed manner. One such principle 
is the code-text — the intermediary between language and text (Lotman 
2005b: 425). A code-text is not an abstract collection of rules required 
for constructing a text, but a syntagmatically constructed totality, an 
organized structure of signs that is not expressed directly, but is reali-
zed as variants in the lower level texts in the hierarchy of the culture 
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(Lotman 2005b: 425). It is especially common for cultures with a mytho-
logical orientation. For an external observer, it may be both ambivalent 
and polyvalent, can be divided into a paradigm of equivalent yet diffe-
rent meanings, or again into a system of antonymic oppositions, but for 
the inhabitants of the culture “the code-text is nevertheless monolithic, 
compact and unambiguous [...] organizing their memories and defining 
the limits to the possible variations of the text” (Lotman 2005b: 426). 
The hegemonic logic of the code-text is in operation in a more concealed 
manner than in previous coding strategies. By imposing specific mutual 
relationships between the positions of the subjects and the conditions 
for their positions, it functions as a dominant process of signification, 
since it establishes some positions as active and others as passive, allows 
some positions to engage in relations with other elements in the text and 
denies this to other positions, approximately determines how to depict 
the beginning and the end of the narrative, etc. A good example is pro-
vided by the hidden code-textual structure of soviet realist literature, 
about which the noted literary scholar Katarina Clark (1981) has written 
that only a single novel was written in the socialist-realist vein — 
M. Gorky’s “The Mother”. All the socialist-realist literature that fol-
lowed was but variants of this invariant code-text.
Here it is important to emphasize that as the culture functions and as 
new texts are generated or meta-descriptions written for the purpose of 
research, every sign of the code-text can appear as a paradigm (Lotman 
2005b: 426) in the same manner as the above-mentioned transformation 
of text into language.
In the above sections I attempted to indicate the main ontological 
and epistemological congenialities between the semiotics of culture and 
the theory of hegemony of the Essex school that could operate as a star-
ting point toward a semiotic theory of hegemony. In the last section, 
I would like to draw attention to some methodological difficulties that 
come with this sort of an approach, the acknowledgement of which 
could lay the basis for the recognition that only a dialogue between 
qualitative (including semiotic) and empirical-positivist methods can 
result in more effective analyses of the political.
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3. Political analysis as auto-communicational process
Approaching a given object of study as a communication-based dis-
course/text raises a number of problems pertaining to philosophy of 
science. We may inquire after the ontological status of theory — in what 
ways does theory generate reality and to what extent can we consider 
such a generation as scientific? 
In the empiricist philosophy of science it was assumed that theoreti-
cal laws or models are too weak in the social sciences (as compared to 
those of the natural sciences). This was used to explain why results in 
the social sciences never acquire the capacity for prediction characte-
ristic of the natural sciences. In post-empiricist philosophy of science, 
to the contrary, it is argued that the explanatory premises of the social 
sciences are too rigid. By firmly fixating the agents’ plans and goals, 
they fail to take into consideration, first, that agents are reflective beings 
capable of learning, and second, that what is important is not just the 
agents’ own self-description but also the way others understand the sig-
nificance of their actions (Bohman 1991: 7).
I will attempt to approach this methodological problem by pro-
ceeding from the theoretical positions of the Tartu–Moscow School 
and especially those of Lotman, positions that may be called semio-
tics of communication. However, I will not be focussing here on the 
trivial argument about the differences in the codes of the addresser 
and the addressee that excludes the possibility of identical meanings 
in the communicative process. Primarily, I will attempt to observe this 
problem based on two different models of communication internal to 
any culture — from the autocommunicative ‘I—I’ and the communica-
tive ‘I—s/he’ models. It is important to emphasize that “for culture to 
exist as a mechanism organizing the collective personality with com-
mon memory and collective consciousness, there must be present a pair 
of semiotic systems with the consequent possibility of text translation” 
(Lotman 2001: 34). “Actual cultures, like artistic text, are constructed 
on the principle of pendulum-like swings between these systems” (ibid.). 
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Thus any analysis of politics, that is, a text, will appear at the field of 
tension between these two models of communication. This will bring 
about significant effects 1) for political analysis as a model of reality 
(the object being studied); 2) to the language used for coding the model 
(to the theoretical meta-language) and 3) for the generator of the text 
(for the researcher who constructs the model). As a result, the multi-
layered and semiotically heterogeneous text that is capable of complex 
relations with both the cultural context that surrounds it as well as the 
reader/the public, ceases to be an elementary message sent from the 
addresser to the addressee.
Let’s take a closer look at these two models of communication. The 
‘I—s/he’ system allows one merely to transmit a constant quantity of 
information, whereas the ‘I—I’ system qualitatively transforms the 
information, and this leads to a restructuring of the actual ‘I’ itself. In 
the first system the addresser transmits a message to another person, 
the addressee, but both the code and the message remain the same in 
the course of the act. 
In the second system, while communicating with him/herself, the addresser 
inwardly reconstructs his/her essence, since the essence of a personality may be 
thought of as an individual set of socially significant codes, and this set changes 
during the act of communication. (Lotman 2001: 22)
Functionally speaking, a text is used as a code and not a message when 
it does not add to the information we already have, but when it trans-
forms the self-understanding of the person who has engendered the text 
and when it transfers an already existing message into a new system of 
meanings (Lotman 2001: 30). This is the result of introducing a supple-
mentary, secondary code: the original message is recoded into elements 
of its structure and it thereby acquires the features of a new message 
(Lotman 2001: 22). 
Under these conditions, the socio-communicative function of the 
text will become more complex. In addition to 1) the function of trans-
mitting information, the text will 2) function as collective cultural 
memory. In this role, the text manifests, on the one hand, a capacity 
for constant supplementation; yet on the other hand it manifests the 
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capa city for actualizing some aspects of the information contained in 
it, and for temporarily or completely forgetting other aspects (Lotman 
2002: 160). Any political analysis will supplement a prior research tra-
dition yet, as a result, will also change it, since adding a new element 
into the tradition will transform the nature of the relationships that 
constitute the prior tradition. This can happen precisely because of the 
simultaneous activity of auto-communication and communication in 
the act of communication, because 3) the text appears simultaneously 
in the role of the medium, helping to reshape the personality of the 
readers, change their structural self-orientation and relations to meta-
cultural constructs” (Lotman 2002: 160). We can treat the researcher 
as the reader who, by constructing the text (political analysis), simul-
taneously consumes it, and through this auto-communicative process 
inserts a different code into the text, for example by making a critical 
overview of what has been done before. Doing this, researchers trans-
form their own previous codes. In this last instance we are concerned 
not merely with a message in a language, but also a message about 
language, a message in which the interest is shifted on to its language 
(Lotman 2001: 15). 
And, finally, we can also distinguish 4) the communication between 
text and its cultural context. The relationship a text has to its cultural 
context may be either metaphorical or metonymic. A good example of 
the first one is the The History of the Communist Party of Soviet Union. 
Short Course (Party Short Course 1939 [1938]) that circulated during 
the Stalinist period as the sole correct treatment of history, in which 
one specific text is perceived as replacing the entire context, as being 
equivalent to the entire cultural context. In cases of metonymy, the text 
represents context as a part represents the whole. An example would be 
the various contemporary treatments of that particular era. But in any 
case we have here a certain (self-)description of the context, where the 
text participates not as an agent of an act of communication, but as its 
full and equal participant, as a source or receiver of information (Lot-
man 2002: 161). And by this participation it always already changes the 
context.
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The processual nature of communication and its auto-commu-
nicative characteristics bring about irreversible consequences in the 
generation of meaning. It may be argued that in semiotics the rela-
tionship A equals A is invalid, meaning that the principle that forms 
the basis of classical logic has been abandoned. In semiotics, a fact 
(a significantly bounded text) never appears in its full positivity, but is 
always the result or the product of deciphering. The text is not only a 
generator of new meanings, but also a condenser of cultural memory. It 
is important to stress that for the perceiver a text is always a metonymy 
of a reconstructed integral meaning, a discrete sign of a non-discrete 
essence (Lotman 2001: 18). Once we proceed from the framework pre-
sented here, however, we must approach facts as meaningful units from 
an entirely different perspective. It does not suffice to say that every 
fact is always loaded with theory — this would only touch upon the 
relationship between scientific meta-language and object-language. By 
referring to the three functions of text, we may pose a counter-ques-
tion: do I have to take a critical look back at the research I have already 
conducted? It is entirely conceivable that the theoretical principles to 
which I have subjected data collection and analysis are entirely valid and 
thus produce deductively valid results. But once we consider that these 
principles themselves have resulted from communication and can only 
be valid during the conditions of communication (because how else 
could we even talk about them), it appears that the watershed is more 
fundamental — no meaning can ever become completely stabilised due 
to its multilingual constitution and because of its retrospectivity. Texts 
that preserve their cultural activity reveal a capacity to accumulate 
information, that is, a capacity for memory — this means that it is also 
the memory of all its interpretations, and what is more, it is also the 
memory of all those historical events which occurred outside the text 
but with which the text can evoke associations. And this is what gives 
the text new meanings (Lotman 2001: 18–19).
Therefore an identical reconstruction of a semiotic whole is impos-
sible in principle. It will always be a model of the new. A reconstruc tion 
of a lost language is always a creation of a new language, not the 
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restoration of the old, even if it does seem like a restoration from the 
perspective of the culture’s self-consciousness. But this recollection/
reconstruction of the old is but a subjective phenomenon from the pre-
sent perspective (Lotman 2005a: 215). If we consider that any political 
analysis is a communicative event, it does appear that we must pay full 
theoretical attention to these consequences in the relationship between 
meta-languages and object-languages.
Conclusion
Things could always be otherwise and therefore every order is predi-
cated on the exclusion of other possibilities. “It is in that sense that 
[exclusion] can be called ‘political’ since it is the expression of a par-
ticular structure of power relations” (Mouffe 2005: 18). This form of 
exclusion is what we call ‘hegemonic practices’ and every hegemonic 
order is susceptible of being challenged by counter-hegemonic practices, 
that is, “practices which will attempt to disarticulate the existing order 
so as to install another form of hegemony” (Mouffe 2005: 18). Rephra-
sing this in the terminology of semiotics of culture we may say that 
every (dis)articulating process is a process of translation, and it depends 
on the nature of this process within cultural context whether the pro-
cess acquires a hegemonic status or not. Therefore we may say that a 
typology of different metaphoric translations and tropes could be of 
central importance to the study of hegemonic relations and would cons-
titute an important contribution by the semiotics of culture to concrete 
empirical analyses of political phenomena.
My further academic vision would be to integrate the characteristic 
concepts of culture and discourse of the semiotics of culture’s and the 
theory of hegemony’s, for example, symmetry and entropy; explosion; 
the unsolvable tension between organization and non-organization, 
regularity and non-regularity; antagonism, etc., into a wider social 
sciences paradigm. By and large, for the social sciences these charac-
teristics describe random and peripheral events and phenomena that 
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are not thought of as substantial parts of social structure. For Lotman 
and Laclau, however, it is precisely these characteristics that are the pri-
mary conditions for cultural development and dynamics. Transferred 
to social sciences, they would require reconsideration of norm and the 
deviation from the norm; they would also begin to undermine social 
determinism as a central category in social sciences. In social theoreti-
cal thought, they would better highlight political, cultural and other 
interest group conflicts and antagonisms that play a decisive role in the 
meaningful constitution of society. 8
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Гегемоническое означивание с точки зрения семиотики культуры
В статье предпринимается попытка интегрировать теории дискурса 
(преимущественно теорию гегемонии Эрнесто Лакло и Эссекской 
школы политического дискурса в целом) с семиотикой культуры 
Тартуско-московской школы. Цель — показать плодотворность семи-
отического подхода в современном анализе политического дикурса. 
Оливер Маркхарт в своей книге Postfoundational political thought: political 
difference in Nancy, Lefort, Badiou and Laclau собирает под названием так 
наз. «постфундаментального» все подходы, которые характеризуются 
в основном отказом от эссенциализма и привлечением характери-
стик культуры и дискурса (таких как асимметрия и энтропия, взрыв, 
антагонизм; непреодолимое напряжение между упорядоченностью 
и неупорядоченностью, регулярностью и нерегулярностью и т. п.) в 
более широкую парадигму социальных наук. Обычно в социальных 
науках вышеперечисленными признаками характеризуются случайные 
и периферийные события и явления. По мнению автора статьи, несмо
тря на то, что в подобных концепциях дискурса используется понятие 
коммуникации, теоретическое обоснование коммуникативного харак-
тера отношений власти оставляет желать лучшего. Поскольку понятие 
коммуникации неразрывно связано с понятием автокоммуникации 
(Лотман), всегда следует рассматривать исследовательский процесс и 
его результат (текст), учитывая их взаимоотношения и взаимовлияние.
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Hegemooniline tähistamine kultuurisemiootika perspektiivist
Käesolev artikkel püüab integreerida diskursuseteoreetilist lähenemist, 
ennekõike Ernesto Laclau ja Essexi koolkonna hegemooniateooriat ja 
Tartu-Moskva kultuurisemiootikat. Eesmärgiks on näidada semiootilise 
lähenemise rakendatavust kaasaegses poliitikaanalüüsis. Oliver Marchart 
koondab oma suurepärases raamatus Postfoundational political thought: 
political difference in Nancy, Lefort, Badiou and Laclau post-fundamenta-
listliku nime alla lähenemised, mida iseloomustab peamiselt essentsialistliku 
aluse kõrvalheit ja kultuuri ja diskursusekarakteristikute (nagu asümmeetria 
ja entroopia; plahvatus; ületamatu pinge organiseerituse ja mitte-organisee-
rituse, regulaarsuste ja ebaregulaarsuste vahel; antagonism jne) kaasamine 
laiemasse sotsiaalteaduste paradigmasse. Enamasti iseloomustatakse 
sotsiaalteadustes äsjanimetatud tunnustega juhuslikke ja perifeerseid 
sündmusi ning nähtusi, mis sotsiaalsesse struktuuri olemuslikult ei kuulu. 
Põhjendused sellisele sattumuslikkusele leitakse filosoofiast (Marchart), 
psühhoanalüüsist laenatud afekti mõistest (Laclau) jne. Siinkirjutajale 
tundub, et vaatamata kommunikatsiooni asetamisele oma diskursuse 
kontseptsiooni üheks teoreetilisteks nurgakiviks, jäetakse nendes kontsept-
sioonides enamasti võimusuhte konstrueerimise kommunikatiivne iseloom 
teoreetiliselt välja arendamata. Kommunikatsiooni mõiste on olemuslikult 
seotud autokommunikatsiooni mõistega (Lotman). Uurimisprotsessi ja 
uurimistulemust tulekski vaadata nende kahe kommunikatsioonimudeli 
valguses, kuna uurimisetulemus (tekst) kuulub ise kultuuri või suuremase 
diskursusesse ja esineb selle kui terviku korrastamise funktsioonis. Seetõttu 
tuleb uurimispraktikat ja selle tulemust alati vaadata vastastikuses mõjus. 
Kultuurisemiootika kommunikatsioonikäsitlus aitab kaasa selle metakeele 
ja objektkeele metodoloogilise aspekti teoreetilisele läbi valgustamisele. 
